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No science can be more secure than  
the unconscious metaphysics which  
tacitly it presupposes.♣ 
 
The value which we attribute to science  
depends upon the idea which we  
collectively form of its nature and  




Science has recently become increasingly salient in various fields of international 
law. In particular, the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement 
stipulates that a regulating state must provide scientific justification for its food 
safety measures. Paradoxically, however, this ostensibly neutral reference to 
science tends to complicate treaty interpretation. It tends to take treaty 
interpretation beyond a conventional methodology under the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which is primarily concerned with clarifying and 
articulating the treaty text. The two decades old transatlantic trade dispute over 
hormone-treated beef is a case in point. This article demonstrates that beneath 
the controversy between the United States and the European Union on the safety 
of hormone-treated beef lurks a critical hermeneutical divergence on the scope 
and meaning of relevant risk science, which a conventional model of 
international adjudication cannot fully fathom. The article is a philosophical 
retelling of what has been regarded largely as a legal-regulatory controversy. 
Informed by the philosophical hermeneutics, the article concludes that only a 
continuing dialogue or communication between disputing parties concerned can 
narrow down the hermeneutical discrepancy on risk science.  
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Prologue: Is “Science” a Solution or a Problem? 
One of globalization’s dividends is an ever-interdependent world with 
ever-increasing traffic and volume of international commerce. The dramatic 
expansion of international trade tends to expose importing countries to a variety 
of foreign foods and food products harvested and manufactured with new 
ingredients and technologies. Yet globalization may be a mixed blessing: Along 
with the diversity associated with international trade may also come unforeseen 
side effects, such as health risks. These risks have begun to emerge as critical 
issues within the global trading system.1 While some importing countries tend to 
take these types of risks seriously and impose preventive regulations, other 
exporting countries resist such measures. The problem is that these risks are 
uncertain and their nature is fervently disputed.  
The World Trade Organization (WTO)2 Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement3 responds to this tension between regulatory autonomy and free trade 
by upholding the right to regulate and at the same time requiring a regulating 
state to provide “scientific” justification for its food safety measures. Ironically, 
however, this ostensibly neutral reference to “science” tends to complicate treaty 
interpretation. The inherent ambiguity, and uncertainty, embedded in the very 
notion of science tends to take its interpretation beyond a conventional 
                                                 
1 See John H. Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 
1-4 (1998) (highlighting the ever-increasing challenges to the global trading system from various 
social regulations).  
2 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 15 
Apr. 1994, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM (1994) 1140; Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments – Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 ILM (1994) 1140 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
3 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Annex 1 A, the WTO Agreement, supra 
note _ [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
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methodology under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),4 
which is primarily concerned with clarifying and articulating the treaty text.  
The two decades old transatlantic trade row over hormone-treated beef is 
quite emblematic of this dilemma.5 While treating cattle with growth hormones is 
an acceptable practice in the United States, the same practice is banned in 
Europe for its potential health risks. This ban has deprived many American dairy 
farmers of lucrative accesses to the European beef market. This article 
demonstrates that beneath the controversy between the United States and the 
European Union (EU) on the safety of hormone-treated beef lurks a critical 
hermeneutical divergence on the scope and meaning of relevant risk science, 
which a conventional model of international adjudication cannot fully fathom. 
The WTO court might be incompetent in addressing a highly dogmatic struggle 
between the U.S. and the EU which originated from conflicting “paradigms” on 
risk science concerning the safety of hormone-treated beef. The article is a 
philosophical retelling of what has been regarded largely as a legal-regulatory 
controversy. Informed by philosophical hermeneutics, the article concludes that 
only a continuing dialogue or communication between disputing parties can 
narrow down the interpretive discrepancy on risk science. 
The beef hormones dispute is not an evanescent anecdote: It has a long 
and recurrent history. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration imposed 
retaliatory tariffs of 100 percent ad valorem on the European Communities (EC) 
imports worth about $100 million after the two parties failed to resolve this issue 
under the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system. 6 
Although a temporary respite was reached in 1989, the issue was so combustible 
that the U.S. brought the same complaint to the new WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism as soon as it was launched in 1996. Although the WTO court ruled 
that the EU’s ban lacked scientific justification in 1998,7 the EC has refused to 
repeal the ban even in the face of the U.S. retaliation authorized by the WTO.8 As 
of today, both parties have failed to fully resolve this issue, though they have once 
again reached a provisional truce under which the EC permitted the U.S. to ship 
                                                 
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 
I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. 
5 See e.g., Eleanor Beardsley, In Europe, A Cow over Hormone-Treated Beef, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, 
Sep. 29, 2009, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113314725 
(reporting on the European farmers’ enmity toward the U.S. hormone-treated beef).  
6 Foreign Agricultural Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Chronology of the 
European Union’s Hormone Ban, available at 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/policy/chronology.html.  
7 European Communities - Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, Appellate Body and the Panel Report, as modified, adopted on Feb. 13 1998, ¶208. 
(emphasis added), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm [hereinafter, AB Report, 
Hormones] (“The absence of such a risk assessment (...) leads us to the conclusion that no risk 
assessment that reasonably supports or warrants the import prohibition embodied in the EC 
Directives was furnished to the Panel.”) (emphasis added). 
8 Sungjoon Cho, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones 
(International Decisions), 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 299, 301-2 (2009) (documenting the EC’s persistent 
refusal to repeal its ban on the hormone-treated beef despite the 1998 defeat in the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure) [hereinafter Cho, Hormones Suspension].  
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additional hormone-free beef only, while preserving the original ban on 
hormone-treated beef.9 
The clash of two conflicting dogmas tends to typify this decades-long 
transatlantic dispute. The U.S. holds that an infinitesimal amount of hormones 
injected into cattle for growth promotion purposes poses no significant health 
risks to humans when consumed. The U.S. justifies its position using the 
mainstream version of science embodied in relevant international standards, 
such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission standards (Codex standards). The 
Codex standards establish the appropriate levels of hormones in the human body, 
as codified in a “Maximum Residue Level (MRL)” and an “Acceptable Daily 
Intake (ADI).”10 In stark contrast, the European Union (EU) takes a different, 
highly preventive approach, accentuating certain minority scientific opinions 
which do identify heath risks in the human consumption of foods administered 
with hormones. Departing from the laboratory-based science, the EU’s position 
rests on practical wisdom tuned into the “real world where people live and work 
and die.”11  
Then, which version of science is the right one? Should we adhere to 
mainstream science, as the U.S. does, and allow hormone-treated beef to freely 
circulate while dismissing any public outcry against it as unreasonable fear? Or, 
should this risk-averse public heuristics still be morphed into a public policy, 
even if the actual probability of health risks is extremely low?12 More importantly, 
could (and should) the WTO court prescribe its own “right” version of science to 
disputing parties? If it could, why has the WTO court thus far failed to put an end 
to this recurring dispute, despite the unequivocal references to “science” under 
the SPS Agreement? This food safety dispute is similar to the climate change 
debate in that two fiercely competing accounts of science impede the creation of a 
coherent international public policy.13 
Surprisingly, however, most legal commentators appear to be oblivious to 
this dilemma.14 Instead, they focus on the allocation of regulatory competence 
between the WTO and domestic regulators. They suspect that the SPS Agreement 
                                                 
9 USTR, USTR Announces Agreement With European Union In Beef Hormones Dispute, May 13, 
2009, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/may/ustr-
announces-agreement-european-union-beef-hormones-.  
10 United States--Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC--Hormones Dispute, Panel 
Report , WT/DS320/R, ¶2.17-18 (adopted Nov. 14, 2008). 
11 AB Report, Hormones, supra note _ , ¶187. 
12 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1071-72 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAW OF FEAR: BEYOND THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)) (raising a similar question “why … should regulatory law 
afford any weight to the uneducated opinions of ordinary citizens as opposed to the reasoned 
judgments of politically insulated risk experts?”). 
13 See Stephen Harding, The Long Road to Enlightenment, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 8, 2007 
(documenting the history of scientific controversies on climate change).   
14 Regarding notable exceptions to this general trend, see David A. Wirth, European Communities 
Restrictions on Imports of Beef Treated with Hormones, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 755, 760 (1998) 
(questioning the SPS Agreement’s “fundamental reliance” on science despite its “evolving” 
nature); Jeffery Atik, Science and International Regulatory Convergence, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 
736, 738 (1997) (rejecting a universalist notion of science and emphasizing its temporal-spatial 
relativity).  
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would impose too much regulatory burden on domestic governments and unduly 
second guess domestic regulatory decisions.15 They fear that the WTO global 
regulation would eventually undermine domestic regulatory autonomy and 
ultimately state sovereignty.16 According to these scholars, domestic governments 
should be allowed to take proactive steps to mitigate public fear, whether such 
fear is rational or irrational,17 despite the WTO’s apparent goal of promoting 
“sound science.” 18  While this literature is useful in understanding certain 
domestic regulatory positions, 19  it nonetheless fails to grasp the root of the 
dispute, i.e., risk science itself, and thus remains largely unable to formulate 
operable international regulatory solutions.  
Other scholars have looked to relevant disciplines, such as political science 
and psychology, to explain risk-related legal reasoning or legal decision-making 
by identifying complicated political dynamics behind these diverging positions on 
risk science 20  as well as the cognitive/social psychological roots of such 
divergence.21 For example, there is some empirical evidence that rent-seeking 
                                                 
15 See e.g., David M. Driesen, What Is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and 
Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 279, 296, 300 (2001) (critically observing that the WTO’s 
regulatory prescriptions would over-burden domestic governments and that WTO panels might 
second guess domestic regulators’ decision-making); Isis Amelia Rose Sien, Beefing Up the 
Hormones Dispute: Problems in Compliance and Viable Compromise Alternatives, 95 GEO. L. J. 
565, 567 (2007) (observing that the WTO might not be an appropriate avenue to handle certain 
non-discriminatory measures such as cultural practices); Andrew T. Guzman, Food Fears: Health 
and Safety at the WTO, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 26-27 (2005) (warning that the WTO court’s 
interference with domestic regulatory prerogatives on food safety might backfire as non-
compliance with its decision).  
16 See e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Julie Soloway, International Trade Policy and Domestic Food 
Safety Regulation: The Case for Substantial Deference by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
Under the SPS Agreement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 537, 557 
(Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) (warning that the WTO as a “global 
science court” might supplant domestic regulatory determinations and thus undermine its 
legitimacy); Layla Hughes, Limiting the Jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement Panels: The WTO 
Appellate Body Beef Hormone Decision, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 915, 916 (1998) (viewing 
that the SPS Agreement’s requirement of scientific justification is not grounded on either 
domestic or international environmental law) ; Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization, 
Meat Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 41, at 1785 (Oct. 15, 1997) 
(arguing that the WTO should not intervene certain domestic health and safety issues). 
17 Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous Public Concerns, and the Hormones Dispute: 
Nothing to Fear But Fear Itself?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 743, 775-76 (2004) (advocating the domestic 
government’s efforts to reduce public fear even if it might not be irrational). 
18 Warren Maruyama, A New Pillar of the WTO: Sound Science 32 INT’L LAW. 651, 653 (1998) 
(observing that the new WTO SPS Agreement ushered in “sound science” in adopting health 
measures).  
19 See e.g., Darrell Chichester, Battle of the Beef, The Rematch: An Evaluation of the Latest EC 
Directive Banning Beef Produced with Growth Hormones and the U.S. Refusal the Accept the 
Directive as WTO Complaint, 21 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 221, 248 (2005) (viewing that the EC’s new 
measure is consistent with the SPS Agreement).  
20 See generally MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009) (detailing political 
factors, such as industry lobbying and capture, behind the transatlantic struggle over genetically 
modified foods). 
21 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAW OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005) 
(attacking the precautionary principle from the standpoint of cognitive psychology).  
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politics or certain psychological biases may motivate judges or policymakers to 
adopt a strict notion of risk science to avoid any opportunistic (protectionist) 
exploitation or erroneous perception of risk science from interest parties or 
disputants.22 
Although these disciplines may be useful for understanding particular 
legal reasoning or legal decision-making that has been made over issues related 
to risk science, they still fail to answer a more fundamental question: whether 
adjudication itself should ever be made in these contentious cases. This is 
because while these disciplines mostly concern factors exogenous to risk science, 
such as political dynamics over risk science or its psychological justification, they 
do not explore a factor “endogenous” to the nature of risk science itself – its 
innate incompleteness and provisionality. Critically, it is this endogenous factor 
which generates the diverging transatlantic scientific validity claims on the safety 
of hormone-treated beef. 
This article contends that insights from the philosophy of science can help 
better understand the real nature of these disputes involving controversial risk 
science. First of all, one should realize that science exists not as an immutable 
truism but as a certain “paradigm.”23 It is not that either the U.S. or the EU 
position on risk science is right or wrong: each position is simply based on a 
different, competing paradigm. In contrast, an ultimate product of any 
adjudication is “binary”: One party will win and the other will lose. Therefore, once 
the WTO court adjudicates this type of dispute in which two competing paradigms 
of risk science clash each other, the court is most likely to pick a winner 
subscribing to a particular paradigm which is deemed more plausible than the 
other. In the course of doing so, the WTO court will elaborate on an ostensibly 
universal textual meaning of “science” pursuant to the VCLT, so as to distinguish 
good science from bad science, the latter of which might be protectionist or 
unreasonable.24 Then, the WTO court will emerge with its own “right answer” on 
the safety of hormone-treated beef, just as the Dworkinian Herculean judge would 
do. 25  However, it seems naive to expect that the court can yield “complete 
intellectual control” on the competing notion of science. To an already dogmatic 
party or its political institution (such as the European Parliament), such an 
outcome would hardly be seen as legitimate.26  
                                                 
22 For example, Howard Chang observed that protectionists might generate food scare 
(“endogenous fear”) to protect the domestic market from foreign competition. Chang, supra note 
_ , at 763. 
23 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 148 (3d ed. 1996) (observing that 
“the competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs”). 
24 According to Warren Maruyama, the aim of the SPS Agreement was to institutionalize the 
“sound science” in the WTO system. See Maruyama, supra note _ , at 652. See also ROBIN 
FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 100 (2009) (observing that science provides “information 
that is reliable, sustainable and true in some absolute sense”). 
25 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239-40 (1986) (portraying, in a metaphoric 
sense, a judge’s role as a demi-god (Hercules) who will always renders right answers).  
26 This is exactly why the EU had refused since to comply with the Appellate Body report issued in 
1998. The EU’s adamant non-compliance led to a successive dispute (Hormones-Suspension) a 
decade later in 2008. See Cho, Hormones-Suspension, supra note _ , at 301-2. 
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The futility of such “judicialization” of science should shift our interpretive 
attention from the mere literal meaning of science to parties’ own understandings 
of science, which are driven by the parties’ history and context, or “horizon”. 
Understanding is “party-dependent.” 27 The EU’s understanding of risk science as it 
is related to the safety of hormone-treated beef is based on its own history or 
context (“horizon”), which the U.S. could not originally share. Obviously, one’s 
horizon, like a prejudice, blinds itself from perceiving an undistorted image of 
others. It is only through the “patient identification and undoing of those facets of 
our implicit understanding that distort the reality of the other”28 that one can truly 
understand, and reconcile with, the other’s position. Through this open process, 
which is often compared to “conversation,” one party can voluntarily accept some 
position which it does not share.29 Then, only then, can these different horizons 
“fuse” and true understanding can materialize.30 
Importantly, these philosophical insights should inform the WTO court’s 
hermeneutical path in addressing trade disputes involving risk science. Instead of 
venturing to force a rushed end to parties’ dogmatic struggle, the WTO court 
should assist guiding parties to discover the solution among themselves via 
collaborative regulatory dialogue.31 The WTO court can facilitate such dialogue 
between disputants by bringing forth certain “procedural” disciplines – such as 
reason-giving, notification and transparency requirements – when it interprets 
major material obligations, such as risk assessment, under the SPS Agreement.  
For example, if a regulating (importing) country unduly refuses to disclose 
its new sanitary measure to an exporting country negatively affected by the 
measure, the WTO court may find in such a refusal negative probative forces 
indicating that the regulating party has in fact failed to fulfill its risk assessment 
obligation under SPS Article 5.1. 32  The WTO court may even establish a 
presumption that the importing (regulating) country’s measure was adopted 
without valid scientific justification. The underlying logic is that the regulating 
                                                 
27 Charles Taylor, Gadamer on the Human Sciences, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO GADAMER 
126, 127 (Robert J. Dostal ed. 2002). 
28 Id., at 132. 
29 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 361 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall 
trans. 2nd rev. 1989). 
30 Id., at 306. See also Kristin Mueller, Hormonal Imbalance: An Analysis of the Hormone 
Treated Beef Trade Dispute Between the U.S. and the E.U., 1 Drake J. Agric. L. 97, 112 (1996) 
(noting that “with growing economic interdependence and an increase in international trade 
issues, cooperation and understanding among nations becomes critical”). 
31 Regarding a peer review model of managing or resolving these disputes, see generally Andrew 
Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 575 (2009) 
(highlighting various committee review procedures under the SPS Agreement and the GATS as 
the “hidden” form of WTO governance).  
32 In fact, it is an established jurisprudence of the WTO court that the lack of regulatory dialogue 
may militate against a regulating country (defendant)’s good faith. See Appellate Body Report, 
United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (29 
Apr. 1996), at 28 (ruling that the U.S. failure to reach out to its trading partners for regulatory 
cooperation constituted an arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination); Appellate Body Report, 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R 
(12 Oct. 1998) (hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle), ¶ 181 (finding that the U.S. government’s denial of 
certain due process rights to exporters constituted an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
under the chapeau of GATT Article XX). 
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country is not likely to conduct a meaningful risk assessment when it fails even to 
take into account the crucial interests of the most affected trading partners 
(exporting countries). 
 Finally, a disclaimer is in order. This article does not concern the 
interpretation of science per se or the complexity thereof. It simply demonstrates 
that an international court, such as the WTO court, might not properly handle 
science-related trade disputes on account of the innate complexity of science. I do 
not intend to present a grand thesis on the interpretation of science in general. 
Instead, the article focuses on the particular issue of food safety risk and science 
as it is related to the WTO norms (the SPS Agreement).  
Also, diverging paradigms of risk science discussed here should not be 
translated directly into any generalized form of cultural determinism. 33  The 
decades-long transatlantic dispute over hormone-treated beef did not transpire 
because Americans are generally risk-friendly and Europeans risk-averse. 
Americans are as risk-averse as, or more so than, Europeans in other areas, such 
as the carcinogenic risks from certain food additives. 34  Yet regarding this 
particular subject-matter (hormone-treated beef) the EU happens to be more 
precautionary than the U.S. side due to a combination of factors, including 
different institutional configurations and some historical contingencies (such as 
recent food scandals in Europe). 35  These factors have eventually led to the 
selective salience of a particular paradigm on risk science within contemporary 
EU society.  
 Against this backdrop, the article unfolds in the following sequence. Part I 
sketches the basic relationship between health risks and international trade. It 
explains how risk science occupies an important place in international trade law 
and offers a brief introduction to the regulatory scheme under the WTO’s SPS 
Agreement. Part II then explores how the ostensibly neutral concept of science 
embedded in the SPS Agreement may generate diverging interpretations. It 
critically observes that this interpretive divergence, which produces different 
regulatory prescriptions on the same issue, can in fact be traced to different 
“philosophical” standpoints between the parties concerned on particular aspects 
of risk science.  
Providing a philosophical analysis on risk science, Part II highlights the 
importance of dialogue and communication in understanding other nations’ 
regulatory situations involving risk science. Part III then applies these 
philosophical insights to international law of risk regulation and argues that the 
                                                 
33 See Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All?: A Comment on the Comparison and 
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207, 208 (2003) (criticizing 
the conventional stereotyping that Europeans are “risk-averse,” while Americans are “risk-
preferring”). But cf. Kahan et al., supra note _ , at 1086-87 (arguing for a positive relationship 
between “cultural worldviews and perceptions of environmental risks”).  
34 This is the so-called “Delaney clause.” See James S. Turner, Delaney Lives! Reports of 
Delaney's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,003, 10,018 (1998). See also 
Wiener, supra note _ , at 225 (arguing that there is “no simple divergence in which Europe or the 
United States is more precautionary than the other across the board” and that “relative 
precaution appears to depend on the risk and the consequences of specific policies than it does on 
broad national and temporal postures”) (emphasis add).  
35 POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note _ , at 5. 
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focus of regulation should shift from “control” to “communication,” while also 
providing some policy suggestions in this regard. The article concludes by 
positing that WTO members’ efforts to narrow the hermeneutical fissure on risk 
science via dialogue will help “constitute” the global trading community because 
such dialogue establishes a collective identity among WTO members and 
internalizes it within domestic legal systems. The article also emphasizes that a 
regulatory dialogue might be a painful process in that it may require a certain 
“identity cost”: One may first change the understanding of self before he or she 
understands the other.36 
 
I. International Trade and Food Safety: A Conspectus  
Trading foodstuffs often result in trading diseases or other harmful 
substances (such as toxins) contained in those foodstuffs. If all trading nations 
share the same regulatory system, policing these problems would be much easier. 
In reality, however, inevitable regulatory heterogeneity among trading nations 
engenders trade disputes as their two paramount goals, i.e., free trade and 
regulatory protection, clash. In other words, exporting countries’ desires for 
better market access may conflict with importing countries’ trade restrictions in 
the name of regulatory protection. Such a clash is most salient when an importing 
country is sensitive to certain risks, while an exporting country is not. Most of the 
recent trade and human health controversies involving hormone-treated beef, 
avian flu, swine flu (H1N1), and genetically modified organisms (GMO), fall 
within this rubric. The following table illustrates the fact that the U.S. and the EU 
have differing sensitivities over a wide range of risks. 
 
[Table 1: Comparison of Risk Sensitivities (The U.S. v. The EU)]  
Risks Sensitive to the EU Risks Sensitive to the U.S. 
Hormone-Treated Beef Mad Cow Disease 
Genetically Modified Foods Particulate Matter 
Toxic Chemicals Lead in Gasoline 
Climate Change The Stratospheric Ozone Layer 
Marine Pollution New Drug Approval 
Guns Nuclear Energy 
Teenage Consumption of Illegal Drugs Teenage Consumption of Alcohol and 
Tobacco 
(Source: Wiener (2003)37) 
 
The prototypical mechanism to reconcile these two values (free trade and 
regulatory protection) was the General Exception clause (Article XX) under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established in 1947. For 
example, although an import restriction may be a violation of certain free trade 
                                                 
36 Taylor, supra note _ , at 141 (“The cost appears as such from the standpoint of the antecedent 
identity , of course. (…) It cannot be denied (…) that the path to acknowledging this is frequently 
painful.”). 
37 See Wiener, supra note _ , at 227-30. 
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obligations (such as GATT Article XI:1)38 in a provisional sense, such a measure 
may be eventually justified as a legitimate policy if that measure is “necessary” to 
protect human health and does not constitute an arbitrary discrimination or 
disguised restriction to international trade under GATT Article XX.39 
The SPS Agreement under the new WTO, which was launched in 1996, 
created a more sophisticated regulatory system featuring “science” and “scientific 
justification” in the fore. Under the SPS Agreement, it has now become a material 
obligation of WTO members to uphold science and base their sanitary measures 
on scientific justification. For example, Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement 
stipulates that any sanitary regulation should be “based on scientific principles 
and [] not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.”40 Likewise, Article 5.2 
requires WTO members to “take into account available scientific evidence” when 
they assess human health risks.41  
Moreover, the SPS Agreement aims to “harmonize” WTO members’ 
sanitary measures to the extent that they incorporate the same scientific 
standards (international standards) provided by representative international 
regulatory organizations, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Article 3.1 
provides that “Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist.” 
Although WTO members are allowed to depart from these standards for a higher 
level of protection, 42  they still have to maintain regulatory “consistency” in 
applying their chosen levels of protection to other comparable regulatory 
situations.43  
                                                 
38 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 
art. XI:1 (“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any 
other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the 
territory of any other contracting party.”) (emphasis added). 
39 Id., art. XX (“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures (…)”). 
40 SPS Agreement, supra note _ , art. 2.2 [hereinafter] (emphasis added). 
41 Id., art. 5.2 (emphasis added). 
42 Id., art. 3.3. 
Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a 
higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures 
based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a 
scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5. (...) (emphasis added) 
43 Id., art. 5.5. 
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or health, or to 
animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable 
distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such 
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. (...) 
(emphasis added). 
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The SPS Agreement, as far as its text is concerned, largely institutionalizes 
scientific positions of the mainstream epistemic community, such as the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission. Annex A of the Agreement defines “international 
standards” for food safety as the “standards, guidelines and recommendations 
established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, 
veterinary drug and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and 
sampling, and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice.” 44  Article 12.3 also 
requires the SPS Committee, which is a regular consultation forum in this area, to 
seek scientific advice from the Commission.45 
 
II. Judicializing Risk Science and Its Discontents 
Although science rose to its prominence in the WTO, a conventional treaty 
interpretation alone might not fully capture its genuine meaning. The traditional 
treaty interpretation method under Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT centers on 
three main elements: text, intention and teleology.46 The primary and foremost 
interpretive methodology is to “reduce agreements to clear language.”47 Here, the 
main mission of an interpreter is to locate the clearest lexicographic “ordinary 
meaning” of each word and phrase in the black letter law. While this is certainly a 
beginning of any interpretation, it is never an end. Most treaty language suffers 
from ambiguities. Considering that treaties are a product of negotiations, these 
textual ambiguities are often indispensible to reach a compromise. Note that 
most, if not all, operative provisions of the SPS Agreement are quite open-ended. 
For example, Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that “members shall 
ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure (...) is based on scientific 
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence (...).”48 But 
what kind of “science” would this Article refer to? Would dictionary meanings of 
the term “science” suffice for the purpose of the SPS Agreement? Should it then 
represent the mainstream version? Or could it also connote a minority, or even 
eccentric, version?  
                                                 
44 Id., Annex A. 
45 Id., art. 12.3 (“The Committee shall maintain close contact with the relevant international 
organizations in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, especially with the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, (...), with the objective of securing the best available scientific and 
technical advice for the administration of this Agreement.”). 
46 VCLT, supra note _ , art. 31:1. The Article provides that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Article 32 reads that “recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of 
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves 
the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.” 
47 Gerald. G. Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our 
‘Interpretation’ of It, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 358, 363 (1971); Peter McRae, The Search for Meaning: 
Continuing Problems with the Interpretation of Treaties, 33 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 
209, 212 (2002). 
48 SPS Agreement, supra note _ , art. 2.2.  
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At first, one might raise a credible assumption that it reflects the 
mainstream view on risk science on sanitary measures considering the context in 
which the term “science” is used elsewhere in the SPS Agreement. The Agreement 
incorporates the norms (international standards) of representative international 
regulatory entities, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 49  The SPS 
Agreement also encourages WTO members to consult these professional 
institutions when they enact and apply domestic sanitary measures.50 Therefore, 
a traditional treaty interpretation under the VCLT, which prioritizes ordinary 
meaning of the text as well and its context, would distill the mainstream science 
based on quantitative data and rigorous methodologies.51  
The Hormones panel apparently subscribed to this conventional version of 
science. In Hormones, the U.S. challenged the EC’s ban on hormone-treated beef 
on the ground that hormones already exist in ordinary meat and other 
foodstuffs.52 The panel, the low WTO court, agreed with the U.S. as the former 
relied heavily on the experts’ opinions.53 According to those scientists consulted 
by the panel, how we consume certain hormones in food, whether endogenously 
in food or artificially injected (“differences in pathways taken or metabolites”), 
does not matter from the human health perspective as long as the amount of 
hormone intake is under the acceptable level set by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission.54 According to this construction, the EC would violate Article 5.5 of 
the SPS Agreement since it committed an “arbitrary” discrimination between two 
comparable regulatory situations. Obviously, the EC did not ban the import of 






                                                 
49 Id., art. 3.1 (“to harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, 
Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines 
or recommendations, where they exist.”). 
50 Id., art. 12.2 (“The Committee shall encourage the use of international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations by all Members and, in this regard, shall sponsor technical consultation and 
study with the objective of increasing coordination and integration between international and 
national systems and approaches for approving the use of food additives or for establishing 
tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or feedstuffs.”). 
51 In this regard, one might observe that the SPS Agreement is based on “sound science.” See 
Maruyama, supra note _, at 652-53.  
52 European Communities - Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/R, 
Panel Report, as modified by the Appellate Body, adopted on Feb. 13 1998, ¶8.171, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm [hereinafter, Panel 
Report, Hormones]. 
53 “[A]ll scientific experts advising the Panel have concluded that residues of the three natural 
hormones present endogenously in meat and other foods or administered for therapeutic or 
zootechnical purposes are qualitatively the same as the residues of these hormones administered 
for growth promotion and that if any differences between these hormones could exist (e.g., 
differences in pathways taken or metabolites), these differences would in any event not have 
consequences for the potential adverse effects of these hormones.” Id., ¶8.187 (emphasis added). 
54 Id. 
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[Table 2: Comparative Oestrogen Intakes from Food Sources] 
Food Unit Weight (g) Oestrogen Intake 
(nano gram) 







Cow Meat 500 75* 
Hen’s Egg 50-60 1,750* 
Cabbage 100 2,400* 
Peas 100 400* 
Wheat Germ 10 200* 
Soybean Oil 10 ml 20,000* 
Milk 500 ml 75* 
* Oestradiol Equivalents  
(Source: Panel Report, Hormones, ¶4.94) 
 
However, the Appellate Body (AB), the high WTO court, sided with the 
EC’s interpretation and thus reversed the panel’s finding. In a rather sweeping 
tone, the AB denied the comparison itself between these two regulatory situations. 
The AB de facto substituted its own version of science for the conventional 
version of science when it identified a “fundamental difference” between these 
two situations.55 The AB observed that any attempt to compare them would lead 
to “absurdity.”56 The AB replaced techne, which is represented by the laboratory 
science, with phronesis, which is based on common sense-based science befitting 
the “real world where people live and work and die.”57 Under this interpretation, 
the EC did not violate Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement since these two situations 
were not comparable in the first place. 
In this particular case (Hormones), the AB’s position prevailed only 
because of its hierarchical superiority to the panel. In other situations, however, 
how could the WTO court overcome such an interpretive dilemma which the 
traditional treaty interpretation prioritizing the “ordinary meaning” and 
“context” is incapable of addressing? Perhaps the WTO court might attempt to 
have recourse to certain non-textual interpretive criteria.58 First of all, the telos 
(purpose and object) of a treaty might help elucidate treaty languages given 
interpretive situations. True, a teleological interpretation is capable of delivering 
a holistic answer to certain interpretive questions confronted by the court. In fact, 
international tribunals, including the WTO AB, often engage in teleological 
                                                 
55 AB Report, Hormones, supra note _ , ¶221. 
56 Id. 
57 Id., supra note _ , ¶187. Cf. Stephen Tyreman, Promoting Critical Thinking in Health Care: 
Phronesis and Criticality, 3 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 117, 117 (2000) (arguing that “phronesis 
adds a necessary corrective dimension to modern Western medicine's over-emphasis on techne”). 
58 One might point to the “special meaning” as a tool to overcome ambiguities of ordinary, 
dictionary meanings. Yet since the special meaning is eventually guided by parties’ “intentions” it 
suffers the same deficiencies as intentions do as an interpretive criterion.  
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interpretations even when they officially declare that they only engage in textual 
interpretations.59  
However, one potential problem in this type of interpretation is that it may 
result in legislative action by the judicial organ.60 Granted, judicial legislation 
may be unavoidable to some extent under certain circumstances.61 Yet within the 
context of highly diverging issues on health risk and science such judicial 
legislation may backfire. Even jurists’ prudence embedded in a teleological 
interpretation may not break parties’ dogmatic positions in comprehending risk 
science. The authority of such interpretation might not stand amid parties’ 
divergent positions on food-borne risks, which reflect their own unique context 
and history. 
Another interpretive criterion might be parties’ “intentions.” Hersch 
Lauterpacht once observed that “it is the duty of the judge to resort to all 
available means – including the rules of construction – to discover the intentions 
of the parties.” 62  In fact, some domestic courts, including the U.S. courts, 
accentuated legislative intentions in interpreting domestic statutes and even the 
Constitution.63 Yet in the realm of international law, such legislative intentions or 
parties’ intentions are not necessarily clear and coherent. Even if parties’ 
intentions may be located in the “preparatory work” (travaux préparatoires), 
such records themselves are often prone to multiple interpretations.64 In fact, 
investigating the negotiation history of the SPS Agreement only confirms the 
deep-rooted divergences between negotiating parties, in particular the U.S. and 
the EU, on certain critical issues in regulating human health risks, such as the 
authority of the normal science symbolized by international standards (e.g., 
Codex standards).65 
                                                 
59 “[A] pretense to determine a legal meaning of a text based on the ordinary meaning of words 
somehow bestows greater hermeneutic propriety on the resultant interpretation. Any critical 
reading of the case law will show that when it appears fit the AB is no less teleological (…) than 
any other tribunal of similar standing.” Henrik Horn & Joseph H.H. Weiler, European 
Communities – Trade Description of Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE 
LAW OF 2002 248, 252 (H. Horn and P.C. Mavroidis eds. 2005). 
60 McRae, supra note _ , at 222. 
61 See e.g., Sungjoon Cho, Global Constitutional Lawmaking, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L._ ,ch. 4.2.1 
(forthcoming 2010) (defending the WTO court’s judicial legislation in the form of “constitutional 
adjudication” in the area of antidumping law (zeroing)).  
62 Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretations and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT.Y.B. INT’L L. 48, 83 (1947). 
63 See e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838) (ruling that the 
interpretation of the Constitution “must necessarily depend on the words of the constitution [and] 
the meaning and intention of the convention which framed and proposed it (…)” (emphasis 
added). 
64 First, the very term “preparatory work” is ambiguous, possibly referring to several different 
documents, such as memoranda, minutes of conferences or even different versions of treaty drafts. 
The 873rd Meeting on the Law of Treaties, Y.B. INT’L L. COMM. vol. I. pt. II, 204 (1966). Second, 
negotiating states are often reluctant in expressing their real intentions. Id., at 207. 
65 See Elizabeth Fisher, Beyond Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World Trade Organization 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note _ , at 329 (attributing the nebulous nature of the SPS text to 
“political compromise and thoughtless drafting”). In addition, many observe that the decision-
making process within the Codex Alimentarius Commission is also very controversial and even 
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In sum, the conventional treaty interpretation methodology under the 
VCLT might not be adequate in textually construing the notion of “science” under 
the SPS Agreement. More than one interpretation might be possible depending 
on which version of science the interpreter adopts. At the same time, non-textual, 
supplemental interpretive criteria would not be sufficient in overcoming the 
interpretive dilemma.  
The uncertain world of science might not be susceptible to a test of 
normative validity, which is basically “binary” (legal or illegal). Thus, an innate 
mismatch exists between the nature of risk science, which is indeterminate, and 
that of adjudication, which is determinate. Nonetheless, if the WTO court does 
adjudicate a science-driven dispute, as it would do over ordinary non-scientific 
trade disputes, and is forced to pick a winner, it is most likely to subscribe to a 
particular paradigm itself.66 This “judicialization” of science amounts to playing a 
Dworkinian Herculean judge in that the court renders the “right” answer, namely 
its own evaluation of scientific validity on the safety of hormone-treated beef.67 
Even if such judicialization is unintentional in the course of reasoning, it may still 
appear to be illegitimate as a judicial organ. The court’s own formulation of 
scientific validity (judicialization) might seem to deviate from its status as a 
neutral arbiter. 
Moreover, judicialization of science may outsource legal issues to science 
or scientists.68 Instead of constructing legal questions via legal reasoning, the 
WTO court might be tempted to simply defer legal scrutiny to expert opinions. In 
some situations, such deference might embolden panelists to determine the 
existence of appreciable risks of carcinogenicity from the consumption of 
hormone-treated beef, instead of merely deciding the existence of a “rational 
relationship” between the SPS measure and the risk assessment.69 
Confronting these latent problems, the WTO court might want to develop 
its own justiciability doctrine so that it could decline to hear these “wrong 
cases”70 and avoid the risk of judicialization of science in the first place. Yet 
                                                                                                                                                 
political. See Thorsten Hüller & Matthias Leonhard Maier, Fixing the Codex?: Global Food-Safety 
Governance under Review, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL 
REGULATION 268 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds. 2006) [hereinafter 
CONSTITUTIONALISM] (introducing a number of literatures which cast doubts on the neutrality and 
integrity of the Codex Alimentarius Commission).  
66 Cf. SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 49 (1990) 
(observing that the U.S. court’s judicial activism on scientific disputes produced an over-
simplified paradigm of “science policy” which blended science with policy). 
67 See Sungjoon Cho, Of the World Trade Court’s Burden, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 675, 685-86 (2009) 
(criticizing the AB’s position in Hormones as the Dworkinian Herculean judge who would hand 
down his or her own final answer as to a highly controversial scientific issue) [hereinafter Cho, 
World Trade Court’s Burden]. 
68 Feldman, supra note _ , at 37-38 (discussing what she coined “externalization” which 
“outsourc[e] legal dilemmas to science”)  
69 United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute, 
WT/DS320/AB/R, Appellate Body Report circulated on Oct. 16, 2008, ¶612, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm [hereinafter AB Report, 
Hormones – Suspension]. 
70 “Wrong cases” refer to those extremely combustible (political) cases which tend to short circuit 
the whole dispute settlement system. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the 
Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 159 (1980). See also William J. 
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besides the WTO court’s actual procedural competence on this judicial avoidance 
tactic, it might not be able to develop operable criteria to screen out wrong cases 
effectively. One might say that all food safety-related disputes might potentially 
be wrong cases to the extent that they are somehow intrinsically combustible on 
account of scientific controversies and socio-cultural sensitivities around them. 
 
III. Philosophizing the Debate: The Hermeneutics of Risk Science 
A. Piercing the Veil of Legalized Science: Why Philosophical Insights?  
Given the aforementioned dilemma of the judicialization of risk science, a 
judicial interpretation might not be adequate in grasping the full meaning of risk 
science related to foods and human health. The following questions tend to 
explore the deep-seated meaning of risk science which a judicial interpretation 
might not capture.  First, why do we interpret any way? Is it for the court to 
resolve a particular dispute or for parties to discover a valid answer (truth) 
behind the dispute? Second, what should be interpreted? Should it be risk 
science reified in the SPS text itself or the version embedded in each party’s 
contextual social reality? Third, who should interpret? Is it more appropriate to 
have a WTO judge with an Olympian detachment from the social context in 
which each science-related dispute is formulated or should it be the disputants 
themselves, who are not only observing but also “experiencing” those risks?71  
Beneath these questions lurks a more fundamental, philosophical issue 
which the WTO court could not fully fathom with the aid of VCLT alone. Note 
that both the Hormones panel and the AB had relied on the VCLT only to 
produce diametrically opposite rulings on the same question. First of all, it may 
be useful to capture this interpretive fissure as a conflict of “paradigms” in the 
Kuhnian sense. Here, two paradigms clashed over the safety of hormones in food. 
One paradigm, which the U.S. and the panel adopted, focuses on the level of 
hormone residue in the human body regardless of its pathway or metabolites.72 
Under this paradigm, there is no significant regulatory difference between 
naturally-occurring hormones in foods (such as hormones in milk or broccoli) 
and artificially-injected hormones (such as hormones in cattle). This paradigm 
represents the mainstream view or the “normal science,” according to Kuhn, 
which is incorporated in the international standards (the Codex standards). 
Therefore, the panel ruled that the EC violated the WTO norms (the SPS 
Agreement) by treating like situations (naturally-occurring hormones and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 67- 78 (1987); John H. Jackson, 
The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 779-
80 (1978) (discussing a similar concept of "big cases," which cannot be handled properly by 
adjudication). 
71 Gadamer criticized the Aristotlean notion of “contingent observations” which tend to focus only 
on the “formation of concepts” in regard to science. Instead, Gadamer emphasized that 
experience is a “process” in which one not only confirms past expectations but also embrace new 
possibilities in understanding. TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note _ , at 352-53. 
72 Panel Report, Hormones, supra note _ , ¶8.187. 
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artificially-injected hormones) in an unlike manner (no regulatory intervention v. 
a total ban).73 
However, the other paradigm which the EU and the AB adopted was 
diametrically opposed to that picked by the U.S. and the panel. For example, the 
EU and the AB highlighted certain man-made risks from abuse or misuse of 
hormones when administered to cattle for growth promotion purpose. 74 
Admittedly, the conventional paradigm would not consider these types of risks 
since it regards the problem of administrative control as “non-scientific” 
factors.75  Yet under the “zero-tolerance” perspective adopted by the EU and 
endorsed by the AB, these man-made risks should also be taken into account in 
assessing risks. Therefore, there might be “fundamental differences” between the 
aforementioned two regulatory situations, which would make the comparison 
itself an “absurdity.” 76  
Given that various food scandals, including the BSE (Mad Cow disease) 
scandal, influenced the shaping of the zero-tolerance trend in Europe, this rather 
practical attitude toward risk science (“real world where people live and work and 
die” 77 ) might be comprehensible. In each society, a confluence of factors, 
including historical contingencies, underlying institutional configurations and 
interest group dynamics tend to establish a paradigmatic equilibrium on a 
particular scientific issue.78 Such equilibrium is not only hard to reverse79 but 
also exhibits critical distributive implications. For example, the European 
paradigm against the hormone-treated beef tends to protect European cattle 
growers who mainly produce hormone-less beef from the influx of American 
hormone-treated beef. Therefore, it is in the vital interest of the American 
                                                 
73 SPS Agreement, supra note _ ,art. 5.5 (“With the objective of achieving consistency in the 
application of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks 
to human life or health, or to animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or 
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such 
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”) (emphasis 
added). 
74 AB Report, Hormones, supra note _ , ¶206 (“We disagree with the Panel's suggestion that 
exclusion of risks resulting from the combination of potential abuse and difficulties of control is 
justified by distinguishing between "risk assessment" and "risk management."”) (emphasis 
added); Panel Report, Hormones, supra note _ , ¶4.194 (“Error! Main Document Only.The 
European Communities claimed that Error! Main Document Only.there were additional risks 
to human and animal health arising from the administration and potential misuse of hormones.”) 
(emphasis added). 
75 Panel Report, Hormones, ¶8.146. 
76 AB Report, Hormones, supra note _ , ¶221  
“[W]e consider there is a fundamental distinction between added hormones (natural or 
synthetic) and naturally-occurring hormones in meat and other foods. In respect of the 
latter, the European Communities simply takes no regulatory action; to require it to 
prohibit totally the production and consumption of such foods or to limit the residues of 
naturally-occurring hormones in food, entails such a comprehensive and massive 
governmental intervention in nature and in the ordinary lives of people as to reduce the 
comparison itself to an absurdity.” (emphasis added). 
77 Id., ¶187. 
78 POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note _ , at 77, 83. 
79 Margaret Levi, A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE 28 (Mark I. Lichbach 
& Alan S. Zucherman eds. 1997) (quoted in POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note _ , at 78). 
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farmers to shift the European paradigm in a way which may permit their 
products to circulate in the European market.80 
The shift of this paradigmatic equilibrium, or “paradigm shift,” might be a 
drastic phenomenon, which amounts to “scientific revolution,” after which “many 
old measurements and manipulations become irrelevant.”81 This rather radical 
character of changing a given position (paradigm) on risk science does not befit 
the nature of judicialization. In other words, maintaining and changing a 
scientific paradigm should not be in the hands of a judge who would pick and 
choose his or her own paradigm under the guise of textual interpretation. At this 
juncture, the interpretive focus should be shifted from the “text” to “parties” to 
fully understand the truth behind science as is exercised in everyday lives.  
Therefore, our inquiry on risk science and international trade should go 
beyond the conventional treaty interpretation and embrace deeper 
(philosophical) inquiries, in particular those related to the philosophy of 
interpretation (“hermeneutics”). Without these additional intellectual efforts, the 
global trading community may not fully diagnose or treat these controversial 
trade and human health disputes. 
B. Science and the Lifeworld (Lebenswelt): Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
Philosophical Hermeneutics 
In everyday lives, scientific inquiries, particularly those related to health 
risks, tend to connote a certain “truth” claim: for example, “hormone-treated beef 
is unsafe to consume,” or in a more radicalized form “we may get cancer if we eat 
a hormone-treated beef.” As discussed above, the conventional (mainstream) 
science tackles these inquiries through a sophisticated set of “methodologies” 
which positivistic scientific knowledge produces after rigorous scientific 
investigation. Therefore, according to this conventional standpoint being 
scientific means being “objective” and “universal.” Under this rubric, what 
science means in the United States should be the same as in Europe.  
This mainstream science is reified in various international standards 
created by standard-setting agencies, such as the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission82  under the auspices of the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The WTO SPS Agreement 
requires WTO members to “base” their sanitary measures on guidelines and 
recommendations issued by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (the Codex 
standards).83 Under the Commission, the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on 
                                                 
80 See Christian Joerges, Law, Science, and the Management of Risks to Health at the National, 
European, and International Level – Stories on Baby Dummies, Mad Cows, and Hormones in 
Beef, 7 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L. 1, 15 (2001) (arguing that both private parties and governments may 
exploit the authority of science and experts in a way which promotes their economic interests). 
81 KUHN, supra note _ , at 129. 
82 FAO, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/understanding/Understanding_EN.pdf.  
83 SPS Agreement, supra note _ , art. 3.1 (“To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on 
as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist (...)”). Paragraph 3 of 
Annex A to the SPS Agreement designates international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations as follows:  
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Food Additives (JECFA), which is an independent body composed of scientists 
working under their individual capacities, establish safe levels of hormone intake 
(“Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADI)”) as well as hormones’ maximum residue limits 
in the human body (“Maximum Residue Limits (MRL)”).84 
However, philosophers have long challenged this positivistic lab scientism. 
Edmund Husserl famously criticized this version of modern science as a 
“mathematization of nature” which is arguably detached from our real life, that is 
to say, “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt).85  Following Husserl’s tradition, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer objected to the conventional premise that an exhaustible scientific 
“method” is an exclusive avenue to a truth claim. According to Gadamer, this 
version of science is nothing more than the “paradigmatic expression of the 
condition that gave rise to epistemology”86 or even the “naiveté of an ontology of 
the world based on the objectivism of mathematical natural science.”87 According 
to Gadamer, the lifeworld is an “intuitively given world” amid ever streaming 
horizons and has a “finite, structure-relative” arrangement yet with 
“indeterminate open horizons.”88  In contrast, the world of science holds the 
“symbolic givenness of a logical substruction that can no more be given by itself 
than infinite series of numbers.”89 While “objective science may be a factor in our 
own lifeworld,” it can only be understood by “historical exploration of its origin 
and its limits of validity.”90 
Gadamer was of the view that truth, including scientific truth, may be 
obtained only through “understanding” or “interpretation” (“hermeneutics”) 
which is a “dialogical-dialectical interchange between interpreter and 
interpretandum.”91 Importantly, understanding cannot be driven from a vacuum. 
Our attitude toward “interpretandum” (what is interpreted), such as a text, event 
or other’s behavior 92  is pre-determined by pre-understandings of past 
interpreters to which we are inevitably inherited (linked) through a chain of 
                                                                                                                                                 
(a) for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established by the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary drug and 
pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and 
guidelines of hygienic practice. 
84 Panel Report, Hormones, ¶¶2.14, 2.17. 
85 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. 
David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Gadamer, The Science of the Life-
World 182 (1969) [hereinafter Life-World], in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (David E. Linge 
trans. & ed. 1976) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS]. 
86 JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH AND METHOD 4 (1985). 
87 Life-World, supra note _ , at 184. 
88 Id., at 193. 
89 Id. 
90 Id., at 194. 
91 Fred R. Dallmayr, Borders or Horizons?: Gadamer and Habermas Revisited, 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 825, 829 (2000). 
92 According to Gadamer, the hermeneutical experience is “universal.” Modern hermeneutical 
theorists, such as Schleiermacher and Ricoeur, have overcome a narrow hermeneutical paradigm 
of the “text-reader” situation (“de-regionalization”). See Anton A van Niekerk, Hermeneutics and 
Historical Consciousness: An Appraisal of the Contribution of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 21 S. AFR. 
J. PHIL. 228, 228-29 (2002). Therefore, an interpretandum or interpretanda can be “all entities 
which contain meaning and thus are potential objects of interpretation. Id., at 232.  
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interpretations (“interpretational lineage”). 93  Interpretation is not 
“presuppositionless” because an interpreter cannot escape from his or her 
ontological premise, i.e., a “finite temporal situation as the horizon within which 
the beings he understands have their initial meaning for him.”94  
Note that this pre-understanding is not a mere bias which, in association 
with enlightenment, is purged by the power of reason, but rather a 
“belongingness” (Zugehörigkeit) to the tradition. This innate historical distance 
(“alienation”) between the interpretandum and the interpreter can be overcome 
only by the “consciousness of effective history.” 95  Only then, the 
interpretandum’s horizon and the interpreter’s own horizon are fused (“fusion of 
horizons”), and an authentic understanding of the interpretandum is achieved.96 
The “universal praxis” of human reason or rationality can no longer monopolize 
the language of science.97  Because the interpreter’s lifeworld “claims its own 
phenomenal legitimacy” based on its characteristic “givenness,”98 the classical 
(neo-Kantian) undertaking of “conceiving the objects of experience in the sense 
of the science of facts”99 becomes a shaky thesis. The AB’s famous dictum in 
Hormones (“real world where people live and work and die”100), which firmly 
rejected a narrow definition of laboratory science, appears to correspond to this 
philosophical position. 
In sum, Gadamer’s hermeneutics accuse scientific positivism, the pedigree 
of which might be traced back to August Comte, of a self-fulfilling prophesy 
gravely detached from the lifeworld. 101  According to Gadamer, those 
presuppositions or prejudices, which constitute our lifeworld or tradition 
(history), are in fact necessary for us to unearth the truth, including the scientific 
truth, from those texts or phenomena before us. They never distract or prevent us 
from getting to the truth.102  
 
                                                 
93 David Weininger, Hermeneutics and Phenomenology, available at 
http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/WeirdWildWeb/courses/wphil/lectures/wphil_theme19.htm# 
(Nov. 30, 1999).  
94 David E. Linge, Editor’s Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note _ , at xlvii. 
95 WEINSHEIMER, supra note _ , at x. 
96 TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note _ , at 306. 
97 Life-World, supra note _ , at 196. Often, cultural or ethical concerns might be reflected in 
formulating scientific standards, such as the Codex standards. See Hüller & Maier, supra note _ , 
at 291. 
98 Life-World, supra note _ , at 183. 
99 Id., at 184 
100 AB Report, Hormones, supra note _ , ¶187. 
101 Tyreman, supra note _ , at 112. See notably JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN 
INTERESTS (1968). 
102 Some scholars define this rather subjective, relative notion of science as “trans-science” which 
is situated between pure scientific facts and value (policy) judgment. See Alvin M. Weinberg, 
Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972); Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and 
Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating 
Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. J. 729, 732-47 (1979). Both articles are cited in Vern R. 
Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-Science Organization”: Scientific 
Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Fact-finding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 251, 251, n.1. (1998).  
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IV. Applying Philosophical Insights to International Law of Risk 
Regulation 
A. From Control to Communication 
Philosophical insights shed critical light not only on the futility of the 
judicialization of science but also on the hitherto lack of genuine mutual 
understanding in the transatlantic dispute over the hormone-treated beef. Note 
that understanding is “party-dependent.” 103 The U.S. should have realized that the 
EU’s understanding on risk science is grounded in the EU’s own history or context 
(“horizon”) as much as the U.S.’ understanding on the same subject is driven by 
the U.S.’ own horizon. Because a party’s original horizon prevents itself from 
recognizing the other’s horizon and its undistorted image, it is only through the 
“patient identification and undoing of those facets of our implicit understanding 
that distort the reality of the other”104 that one can truly understand, and reconcile 
with, the other. Only in this open-mindedness, which is often compared to 
“conversation,”105 can one party voluntarily accept some position which may be 
even against itself.106 A dialogue partner can question our assumptions which we 
could not doubt on our own but which we should nonetheless rethink to reach our 
own understanding. 107  Only with this dialogue or conversation can different 
horizons be “fused,” followed by a true understanding of the other.108 In sum, 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical openness urges an interpreter to endeavor to fuse her 
own horizon with that of other party’s horizon to extract meanings, namely to 
“understand.” 
Applying this theory of philosophical hermeneutics to risk regulation 
within the meaning of the WTO, one can embrace two different subjects of 
understanding: facts and norms. For example, an exporting country may 
interpret an importing country’s regulation to protect human health, such as a 
ban on hormone-treated beef. Then, the same member is positioned to interpret 
relevant WTO texts related to risk regulations, such as the SPS Agreement, in 
tandem with its previous interpretation on the facts. These two subjects are often 
enmeshed in practical interpretive situations.  
Here, the critical hermeneutical error which the exporting country might 
commit is its impulsion for “control” over the dogmatic struggle with its trading 
partner via a manipulative application of scientific methodologies, which might 
border on “myths,” not science in its true meaning. 109  In many cases, “a 
tremendous leap from a tiny amount of data” may still appear to be scientific.110 
Blind faith in a particular set of laboratory data when evaluating a trading 
                                                 
103 Taylor, supra note _ , at 127. 
104 Id., at 132. 
105 Id., at 134. 
106 TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note _ , at 361. As in the principle of Socratic dialogue, every 
conversation (dialogue) should start from the point of the “docta ignorantia” which is to 
acknowledge the original ignorance as well as fallibility. Van Niekerk, supra note _ , at 234. 
107 George Warnke, Law, Hermeneutics, and Public Debate, 9 YALE J. L. & HUM. 395, 411 (1997). 
108 TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note _ , at 306. 
109 Karl R. Popper, Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report, in BRITISH PHILOSOPHY IN MID-
CENTURY 155, 157 (C.A. Mace. ed., 1957) (characterizing Marxism and psychoanalysis as “myths”). 
110 Feldman, supra note _ , at 145. 
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partner’s risk regulation would not lead to any genuine scientific understanding, 
especially when scientists fail to agree on critical scientific issues. Likewise, if the 
WTO court plays a Dworkinian Hercules by subscribing to a certain paradigm of 
science and imposes it on a losing party, the court tends to disregard that party’s 
unique regulatory context. Naturally, the losing party is likely to perceive such 
interpretation as flawed and illegitimate.111  
The essential lesson from the philosophy of hermeneutics – as it is related 
to risk science in the WTO – is an unyielding interpretive openness112 through “a 
lessening of distance”113 between an interpreter and an interpretandum, anchored 
by a firm acknowledgement of the inevitable finitude of human experience.114 
After all, the truth can emerge only “in a conversation.”115 Nor does there exist a 
final, definite answer when it comes to understanding (truth). Truth only exists, 
or operates, continuously in the “hermeneutical circle”116 between the interpreter 
and the interpretandum. In other words, the interpreter should continue to ask, 
and refine, questions until he or she is satisfied, that is to say until the 
interpreter’s horizon is fused with that of the others. This is why American 
regulators would not understand, in a genuine manner, the European ban on the 
hormone-treated beef until they actually reach out to their European counterpart 
and fully appreciate the “phenomenon itself in its unique and historical 
concreteness.”117  
One may locate this hermeneutical circle in a regulatory dialogue within 
the context of the SPS Agreement. Mutual understanding is possible when such a 
dialogue changes either party or both parties participating in the dialogue. This 
dialectic is not about one party forcing the other party to accept the former’s 
original position. Rather, hermeneutical convergence can occur when a dialogue 
induces the modification of an original position of either or both parties in the 
form of mutual understanding. The following table may illustrate this dialectic 





                                                 
111 Cho, World Trade Court’s Burden, supra note _ , at 710 (“[T]he Court's judicialization of 
science may become ‘political’. Under these circumstances, the Court's exercise of its interpretive 
burden over the BOP tends to erode its legitimacy by inviting more, not less, politics from the 
parties concerned.”). 
112 See Axel Honneth, On the Destructive Power of the Third: Gadamer and Heidegger’s Doctrine 
of Intersubjectivity, 29 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM, 5, 5 (2003); Dennis J. Schmidt, Gadamer, in A 
COMPANION TO CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 433 (Simon Critchley & William R. Schroeder eds. 1998). 
113 Honneth, supra note _ , at 5. 
114 Schmidt, supra note _ , at 440. 
115 Id., at 434 
116 “Understanding is (…) a circular movement in which the understanding of the meaning of new 
chapters of the book proceeds on the basis of the understanding the interpreter has constructed of 
the meaning and unity of the previous chapters, while at the same time, his or her understanding 
of the new chapter may require revising the understanding of those previous parts.” Warnke, 
supra note _ , at 409. 
117 Schmidt, supra note _ , at 436; TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note _ , at 6. 
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[Table 3: Two Possible Hermeneutic Circles for Hermeneutical 
Convergence] 
  
1. A0  (B0  B1)  A0  (B1 B2)  … 
2. A0 B0  (A0 A1)  (B0 B1)  … 
 
Suppose that A is an exporting country which raises an inquiry on B, an 
importing (regulating) country, regarding B’s sanitary measure. A0 is A’s original 
position on risk science (risk assessment) according to which B’s sanitary 
measure is without scientific justification. B0 is B’s original position on risk 
science according to which its measure is scientifically justified. Under the first 
scenario, A demands from B scientific justification behind B’s measure. In the 
course of preparing for answers to A’s inquiry, B may seek to discover the context 
of A’s inquiry, such as A’s motivation, background, culture and interest. Such 
discovery tends to make B better understand A0. Then, B may want to voluntarily 
modify its original position (B0B1) to accommodate A0. This process may 
continue multiple times until B’s policy change truly gets fused with A’s original 
position (A0).  
Under the second scenario, the modification of original positions is 
reciprocal. In the course of reason-giving and reason-receiving, both parties 
embrace opportunities to change their original positions (A0A1 and B0B1). 
After multiple loops of such regulatory dialogue, both parties may reach mutual 
understanding with their mutually changed positions. In other words, as the 
number of loops or interactions (n) increase, their hermeneutical discrepancy 
(Bn-An) tends to shrink toward zero. Between these two highly simplified yet 
non-exhausted scenarios, one might reasonably speculate that the second 
scenario might signify a better chance for mutual understanding in that the 
probability of closing the hermeneutical gap (Bn-An) appears higher here than 
the first scenario.  
B. Some Policy Suggestions  
Philosophical discussions on hermeneutics have important ramifications 
on the current debate on international trade and risk science. At present, there is 
little shared understanding among WTO members on the very meaning of science 
or scientific justification as to the health risks of various food additives or other 
food modification technologies. Given this situation, any impulsive legal-
regulatory attempt in the international level to impose a specific paradigm of 
science in a specific trade dispute is likely to invite more disputes, rather than 
resolving them. In this regard, the theory of philosophical hermeneutics tends to 
offer some practical suggestions.  
First, disputing parties should restrain their temptation to jump to WTO 
litigation over those disputes which involve different paradigms of science. A 
losing party would find it difficult to tolerate a decision which goes against its 
socio-cultural fundamental (horizon). Adjudicating these cases is likely to 
produce wrong cases 118  and only cost the WTO its efficacy and legitimacy. 
                                                 
118 See supra note _. 
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Therefore, parties should engage more in dialogue on the root issues through 
various institutionalized avenues under the WTO, such as consultations, SPS 
committee and other peer review forums (e.g., the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM)).119 In this line, the constructive resolution of a recent trade 
dispute involving genetically modified (GM) products between the EU and 
Canada was hermeneutically sound, especially given that both parties established 
an avenue for continuing dialogue.120 
Notably, an increasing number of SPS disputes have recently been 
resolved under the SPS Committee. Nearly thirty percent of “specific trade 
concerns” reported to the SPS Committee were addressed by discussions and 
consultations under the Committee process. 121  Although those specific trade 
concerns handled in the SPS Committee may or may not involve controversies 
related directly to different paradigms of risk science, this extra-judicial peer 
review mechanism still offers an operable avenue for regulatory dialogue over 
risk science.  
 
 
[Table 4: Specific Trade Concerns: Resolved Issues (1995-2008)] 










































                                                 
119 This dialogue is not limited to regulators. Through a dialogue, scientists may narrow their own 
epistemic gap in evaluating scientific theories and data. See Douglas Crawford-Brown et al., 
Environmental Risk, Precaution, and Scientific Rationality in the Context of WTO/NAFTA 
Trade Rules, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 461, 468 (2004) (observing that risk science should be located in 
the “dialogue” among scientists regarding “how to judge data and theories, how to weight lines of 
evidence, and how to balance these considerations in a judgment of epistemic status and in a 
depiction of the uncertainty in risk estimates”). 
120 See David Akin, EU Drops Ban on Genetically Modified Canola from Canada, Calgary Herald, 
Jul. 15, 2009; Ian Austen & James Kanter, Canada Settles a Crop Trade Complaint Against 
Europe, NY Times, Jul. 16, 2009. 
121 WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Review of the Operation and 
Implementation of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
G/SPS/36, Jul. 11, 2005. See also Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 
537-38 (2004) (noting that an SPS dispute between Canada and Brazil regarding the former’s ban 
on the latter’s export of beef for the fear of the BSE (Mad Cow diseases) was resolved under the 
SPS Committee process by adopting a revised “Recommended Procedures for Implementing the 
Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7)”); Lang & Scott, supra note _ , at 592-
95 (introducing several SPS disputes which were addressed under the SPS Committee’s peer 
review (“Specific Trade Concerns”) process). 
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Even if the WTO court eventually adjudicates these kinds of disputes due 
to the absence of a judiciability doctrine, it should focus on those tasks which the 
judicial system is well suited to address.123 One conceivable option is for the WTO 
court to adjust its hermeneutical focus to “procedural” obligations, such as 
reason-giving, transparency and notification, which mandate dialogue and 
communication between concerned parties. These procedural obligations enable 
regulating states to reach out to certain “omitted voices,” 124  such as foreign 
governments and producers, and get access to the latter’s regulatory context 
(horizon). In an effort to facilitate this kind of communication between regulating 
states and those affected by such regulations, the WTO court may accord certain 
                                                 
122 WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Specific Trade Concerns: Resolved 
Issues, G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.9/Add.3, Feb. 6, 2009. 
123 Feldman, supra note _ , at 167. 
124 See Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: 
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226, 230 (John D. Graham & Jonathan 
Baert Wiener eds., 1995). 
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probative value to the regulating state’s undertaking of these procedural 
obligations. In other words, whether the regulating state discharged the burden 
of proof as to its “substantive” requirement, such as the existence of a “rational 
relationship” between a risk assessment and the final regulation, may depend on 
whether the same state performed those procedural obligations. 125  The 
underlying logic beneath this probative incentive is that any risk regulation 
adopted without a hermeneutical empathy tends to lack its rational (scientific) 
basis. Perhaps such flawed regulations may be protectionist or pseudo-scientific 
measures. In fact, this procedural-substantive nexus is not new. As is seen in 
other courts, certain procedural deficiencies are often linked to substantive 
violations.126  
For example, under the SPS Agreement an exporting state may ask to an 
importing (regulating) state about “the products to be covered by the regulation 
together with a brief indication of the objective and rationale of the proposed 
regulation.”127 If the regulating state fails or neglects to respond to the inquirer in 
this situation, such failure or neglect may generate a plausible suspicion that the 
regulating state in fact lacks a risk assessment which would scientifically justify the 
regulation in question. At this juncture, the burden of proving that the regulating 
state nonetheless complied with the risk assessment requirement (SPS Article 5.1) 
may be shifted to the defendant (regulating state). Under the SPS Agreement, one 
might locate several possibilities of such a nexus between procedural and 
substantive obligations. In each nexus, a regulating state’s failure to fulfil a certain 
procedural obligation may militate against discharging the burden of proving that 






[Table 5: Matching Procedural Obligations with Substantive 
Obligations under the SPS Agreement] 
Procedural Obligations Substantive Obligations 
Article 3.4 (requiring members to 
engage in serious dialogue on 
international standards); 
Article 5.8 (requiring a member 
deviating from international standards 
to answer an exporting country’s 
inquiries)  
Article 3.1 (requiring members to base 
their SPS measures on relevant 
international standards) 
                                                 
125 Cho, World Trade Court’s Burden, supra note _ , at 717-18 (discussing a “Copernican turn” of 
shifting from “substantive finality” to “procedural legitimacy”).  
126 Under some jurisdictions, a procedural failure (such as the absence of notification) may lead to 
disapplication of an underlying (substantive) measure. See e.g., Case C-194/94, CIA Security 
International SA v Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL, [1996] ECR I-2201 (ruling that a domestic 
court should disapply a technical regulation if a Member has failed to notify such regulation to the 
European Commission under Directive 83/189).  
127 SPS Agreement, supra note_, Annex B, ¶5(b). 
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Article 5.8 (requiring a member 
deviating from international standards 
to answer an exporting country’s 
inquiries); 
Article 7 (requiring members to notify 
information on their SPS measures)  
Article 5.1 (requiring the existence of a 
rational relationship between a risk 
assessment and an SPS measure)  
Article 5.8 (requiring a member 
deviating from international standards 
to answer an exporting country’s 
inquiries); 
Article 7 (requiring members to notify 
information on their SPS measures) 
Article 5.4 (requiring members to take 
into account the goal of minimizing 
negative trade effects); 
Article 5.5 (requiring members to 
maintain consistency in determining the 
appropriate level of regulatory 
protection) 
Article 5.7 (the 3rd & 4th Prong) 
(requiring members to explore 
additional information for an objective 
risk assessment when imposing a 
provisional measure and review the 
measure within a reasonable period of 
time) 
Article 5.7 (the 1st & 2nd Prong) 
(requiring members to adopt a 
provisional measure only when there is 
insufficient scientific information but on 
the basis of any pertinent available 
information) 
 
Finally, WTO members, in and out of the WTO context, should seriously 
seek to “educate” the public as to the risk science on specific trade issues. This 
education and social marketing will raise awareness and literacy among 
consumers and policymakers on key issues on science and human health, which 
will in turn facilitate risk communication among the concerned parties. Once 
regulators, regulatees and affected parties (consumers) are placed in the same 
hermeneutical circle, we may expect some kind of hermeneutical convergence in 
which the Gadamerian fusion of horizons transpires. Until then, we might have to 
get accustomed to the twilight zone of science.128 
In conclusion, the WTO court’s interpretive refocusing on procedural 
disciplines not only enhances the legitimacy of its decision but also helps parties 
reach mutually acceptable regulatory settlement through continuing regulatory 
cooperation. As the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding advises, parties 
themselves should think hard about whether using the WTO dispute settlement 
system would be really “fruitful” before they file the complaint.129 
 
                                                 
128 The EU’s new policy on genetically modified (GM) foods, which is coined “technical pluralism,” 
seems to be based on this position. It permits the “co-existence” of GM and non-GM supply 
chains. See generally Justo Corti Varela, The EU “Coexistence” Policy under WTO Law: Problems 
and Solutions, Conference Paper presented to the ESIL-ASIL Research Forum (“Changing 
Futures?: Science and International Law), Oct. 2009 (on file with the author).  
129 WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 
to the WTO Agreement, supra note _ , art. 3.7 (“Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its 
judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful.”). 
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Epilogue: Risk Governance, Democracy and the Global Trade 
Constitution 
Beneath the decades-long dispute between the U.S. and the EU on the 
safety of hormone-treated beef lies a critical hermeneutical divergence on the 
scope and meaning of relevant risk science. Since the WTO court’s conventional 
treaty interpretation could not fathom such a deep paradigmatic fissure, its 
“judicialization” of risk science would fail to resolve the dispute in a genuine 
sense: the already dogmatic losing party would not accept the court’s decision. It 
would attempt to find ways to window-dress the decision and create a mere 
semblance of compliance. In fact, this is what the EU has done for the last two 
decades since it lost the Hormones dispute in 1998.130 In this regard, parties 
concerned, the article contends, should abide by philosophical insights which 
suggest that they engage in genuine communication toward mutual 
understanding, rather than struggling to prevail over the other in litigation as 
each party still adheres to its original position in a dogmatic fashion. Some 
hermeneutical refocusing by the WTO court via the re-operationalization of the 
burden of proof may encourage disputants to communicate more vigorously.  
Admittedly, communication toward genuine understanding of the other’s 
position might be a “painful” process.131 It demands an “identity cost” since one 
cannot understand the other unless one changes the understanding of the self.132 
This is a critical “inward-looking” aspect of understanding: an interpreter should 
be willing to change his or her own original position and tolerate the plurality of 
interpretation in the hermeneutical circle. 133  The openness of hermeneutical 
circle also corresponds to the democratic rationality based on the deliberation 
requirement. 134  In this sense, science may be implemented only as a “weak 
program” whose premise is that “democratic values (…) are necessary conditions 
for the development of epistemic strategies that can lead to critical understanding 
of our individual and collective experiences and progressive (…) inquiry.”135 
The WTO norms’ communicative function, embedded in a number of 
procedural obligations, such as reason-giving, notification and transparency 
principles, hold the potential to facilitate such democratic deliberation on risk 
science in the international sphere by channeling collective experiences and thus 
creating/extending shared understanding. Considering that law is the basic 
                                                 
130 See supra note _.  
131 Taylor, supra note _ , at 141. 
132 Id. 
133 Grondin, supra note _ , at 44. 
134 Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World 
Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2342-43 (2000). 
135 Sal Restivo, The Myth of Kuhnian Revolution, 1 SOC. THEO. 293, 299 (1983). See also Howse, 
supra note _ , at 2342-43 (observing that citizen’s value judgments should be able to trump 
mainstreams science under certain circumstances). Admittedly, if one understand democracy 
more from a representative (political), not necessarily deliberative, standpoint, there might be a 
tension between democracy and science; Fisher, supra note _ , at 330-31 (observing that the SPS 
Agreement might become politically problematic if a domestic SPS measure departing from the 
normal science is seen as a “democratic” responsibility of that government); Vern R. Walker, The 
Myth of Science as a “Neutral Arbiter” for Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
197 (2003). 
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medium for social integration,136 WTO members should not underestimate such 
law’s communicative nature. This communicative law or legal process will 
provide WTO members with adequate hermeneutical openness which will enable 
the fusion of horizons in a given area of risk science among WTO members.  
Perhaps it is an important mission of trade law scholars to help develop a 
common “language” of science which can carry with it a set of “background 
understanding” of an extended lifeworld as well as more inclusive accounts and 
possibilities. 137  As interlocutors, the academic community may facilitate 
communication necessary to fuse different horizons and establish a “common 
lifeworld” 138  by producing a common conceptual framework in the form of 
discourse or language. At this juncture, the exigency of “education” as a special 
form of communication arises. Gadamer did not put much hope in the role of 
scientific reason and method in humanity’s future: what was promising to him 
was the “infinite openness of interpretation,”139 which is only possible through 
building up “sensitivity to the kindred sense communicated in the experience of 
the work of the art.”140 In this sense, openness requires cultivation or education 
(Bildung). 
In conclusion, understanding risk science as it affects international trade 
can be a “constitutional” issue which forces us to decide not only whether we can 
but also whether we should do certain things: it inevitably hides a moral-
normative impulse. 141  The unique moral-normative thesis entrenched in the 
hermeneutics of science is highly inductive to a constitutional dimension of the 
global trading system since it shapes the system’s collective identity. 
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